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REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY
AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY SURVEILLANCE:
THE IMPACT OF CALIFORNIA v. CIRAOLO AND
DOW CHEMICAL v. U.S. ON TITLE III OF THE
OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE
STREETS ACT
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution protects all
persons and their communications from unreasonable government
searches.' In order to establish a fourth amendment violation, a subject
needs to show that government actors conducted a search which violated
both society's and the subject's expectations of privacy.2 Courts can ex-
clude evidence collected in violation of the fourth amendment.3 How-
ever, even when a subject has an apparent fourth amendment right,
government officials can still conduct a search if they act within the scope
of a valid search warrant4 or if one of the exceptions to the search war-
rant requirement applies.5 Neutral magistrates issue such warrants only
after the government meets certain procedural protections.6
In addition to the traditional fourth amendment protections, Title III
1. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see C.H. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 11 1-112 (2d. ed. 1986) [hereinafter WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN]; see infra notes 54-74
and accompanying text.
2. Id. This two-part analysis comes from Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz. 389 U.S. at
361. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). See infra
notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
3. Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963); see WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 16-68.
4. WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 136-140.
5. The plain view rule and the open fields doctrine are the main exceptions that this Note
considers. See infra notes 46-53 and accompanying text. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra
note I, at 140 (comprehensive list of exceptions to warrant requirement).
6. A neutral and detached magistrate must issue a search warrant. See Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (warrant invalid because state attorney general, acting pursuant to
state law, issued the warrant). The warrant must be based on a probable cause belief that the items
sought are in the place described in the warrant. See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319
(1979)(neutral and detached magistrate determines whether probable cause exists, but here warrant
invalid because magistrate participated in the search). The warrant must describe with particularity
the place to be searched and the items to be seized. Compare Marron v. U.S., 275 U.S. 192 (1927)
(government actors may not seize things not described in the warrant) with U.S. v. Bridges, 419 F.2d
963 (8th Cir. 1969) (fruits of criminal activity found in "plain view" during a search may be seized
even though not described in the warrant). The warrant must be executed within a reasonable time
so that the conditions justifying the probable cause finding do not change. The federal rule requires
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of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III)'
specifically protects "oral communications" from surreptitious intercep-
tion.' The requirements for obtaining a search warrant to intercept oral
communications under Title III' and the level of judicial supervision t°
are far more stringent than the requirements for and supervision over the
traditional search warrant." In order to invoke Title III protections of
oral communications, however, a subject must meet the same generic
standards applicable in traditional fourth amendment analysis: the per-
son must show a government search, 12 a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy, and a reasonable objective expectation of privacy. 13 A person who
fails to satisfy any of these conditions loses both fourth amendment and
Title III protections of oral communications.
This Note focuses on the reasonable objective expectation standard
found in both the traditional fourth amendment analysis and in the Title
III definition of protected oral communications. The standard arose in
that the warrant be executed within ten days. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c). See generally WHITEBREAD
& SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 104-63.
7. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982)),
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2), § 2512-2520 (1982 & Supp. 1987). See infra notes 126-29 and accom-
panying text.
9. The application for permission to electronically intercept oral communications must detail
the particular offense in question; describe the nature and location of the facilities where the inter-
ception will occur; describe the type of communication to be intercepted; identify the person (if
known) whose communications are being intercepted; explain why other investigative methods will
not succeed; state all previous applications made to intercept communications from the same per-
sons, facilities, or places; state the duration of the interception; and include such other evidence as
the judge may require. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1-2) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
At the federal level, only the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General specially desig-
nated by the Attorney General may authorize an application to a federal judge of competent jurisdic-
tion. See U.S. v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) (Attorney General or his specific designee must sign
each wiretap application). At the state level, state officials of a similar level must authorize the
applications to intercept communications under Title III. See, e.g., State v. Farla, 218 Kan. 394,
544 P.2d 341 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 949 (1976). See generally WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN,
supra note 1, at 308-09.
10. The judge may require the applicant to furnish additional testimony or documentary evi-
dence in support of the application. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(2) (1982). Once the judge issues the order
allowing the interception, he may require updated reports showing what progress has been made
toward achieving the authorized objective and showing the need for continued interception. Id.
§ 2518(6).
11. Compare supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text with notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
12. Although Title III also proscribes private activity, this Note focuses primarily on a criminal
defendant's position with respect to government activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(6) (1982) ("person"
defined to include government employees and private individuals).
13. The definition of protected "oral communications" is composed of a subjective and an ob-
jective component. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1982). See infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
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Katz v. U.S., 4 a traditional fourth amendment case, which Congress in-
corporated into Title III.15 Recently, the Supreme Court considerably
limited the breadth of an individual's objective expectation of privacy in
California v. Ciraolo 6 and Dow Chemical Co. v. U.S.," both traditional
fourth amendment cases. Arguably, this higher standard for traditional
fourth amendment analysis will cause a like change in the objective ex-
pectation standard for oral communications under Title III. Should this
occur, then, as technology advances future defendants may find it impos-
sible to enjoy the significant Title III procedural protections.' 8 Accord-
ingly, this Note proposes a solution which will help prevent the complete
erosion of the objective expectations standard in Title III.
Specifically, Part I discusses the history of the fourth amendment and
the development of the reasonable objective expectation standard under
Katz. Part II analyzes the impact of Ciraolo and Dow on the reasonable
objective expectation standard set out in Katz. Part III provides the leg-
islative history and pertinent textual provisions of Title III. Part IV ana-
lyzes the impact of Ciraolo and Dow on Title III. Part V proposes a
solution which will maintain fourth amendment and Title III protections
in the face of advancing technology.
I. HISTORY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. Pre-Katz
Prior to Katz v. United States,19 the Supreme Court analyzed fourth
amendment search and seizure cases by asking whether the government
14. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (Supp. 1987). See Note, The Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by
Eavesdropping on Cordless Telephone Conversations, 86 COL. L. REv. 323, 340-41 n. 129 & 131
(1986); Note, Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace: The Need for Standards, 52 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 438, 444-48 (1984).
16. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
17. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
18. If a person cannot demonstrate a reasonable objective expectation of privacy from a given
form of surveillance, then no "oral communication" exists within § 2510(2) of Title III and thus
Title III procedural protections do not apply. See infra text accompanying note 114. The technol-
ogy based standards for objective expectations in Ciraolo and Dow suggests that this possibility is
real. See infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
19. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court moved away from its approach of
examining physical boundaries to determine which areas the fourth amendment protected. The
Court turned to an "expectation of privacy" standard which encompassed less tangible boundaries.
See Note, Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure- Warrantless Aerial Surveillance, 54 TENN. L. REV.
131 (1986).
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had physically intruded into a person's home or business or had seized
his personal papers or effects."0 One's "home" included the immediate
area around the dwelling, the "curtilage". z1 A home did not include,
however, "open fields." 2 This open fields exception authorized officials
to observe all activities outside a dwelling or its curtilage23 and to enter
and search the field without probable cause and without a warrant.24 By
distinguishing between the curtilage and open fields, the Court attempted
to create a bright-line test for determining the legality of an official's war-
rantless search.25
The Court based its curtilage rules on the common law understanding
that laws protecting a house also reached nearby structures.26 The
court's rulings extended the curtilage to the area associated with the inti-
mate activities connected with the "sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life."' 27 Additionally, lower courts defined the extent of the
curtilage by determining whether a person reasonably would have ex-
pected that a given area would remain private.28
In Olmstead v. U.S.29 the Supreme Court demonstrated its insistence
20. The fourth amendment reads: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated ..."
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1927) the Court added the following
language to the fourth amendment in its holding: "[Unless there has been an official search and
seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual
physical invasion of his house or "curtilage' . ." Id. at 466 (emphasis added to show additional
language). Thus, the Court effectively read a physical intrusion requirement into the fourth
amendment.
21. United States v. Dunn, 1075 S. Ct. 1134 (1987). See infra notes 26-45 & 66-70 and accom-
panying text.
22. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). See infra notes 50-53 & 71-74 and accompa-
nying text.
23. Hester v. U.S., 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
24. Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (officers traversed one mile path on defendant's land
without a warrant to discover marijuana patch).
25. Hester v. U.S., 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (all that is not in the curtilage is in the open field).
26. Thus, in the case of burglary Blackstone extended the protective curtilage:
"[i]f the barn, ftable, or warehoufe be parcel of the mainfionhoufe, though not under the
fame roof or contiguous ...for the capital houfe protects and privileges all it's [sic]
branches and appurtenants .... [however,] no diftant barn, warehoufe, or the like, are
under the fame privileges, nor looked upon as a man's caftle of defence ..
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225.
27. Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (quoting Byrd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
28. See, eg., United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992, 993-94 (4th Cir. 1981) ("expectations of
privacy are inherent in the common law concept of 'curtilage' "); United States v. Williams, 581
F.2d 451, 453 (5th Cir. 1978) (presence of curtilage helpful in determining the existence of reason-
able privacy expectations).
29. 277 U.S. 438 (1927).
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on a physical intrusion into the curtilage. The Court ruled that federal
prohibition officers did not violate a defendant's fourth amendment
rights when they wired into the phone lines of the office building where
the defendant rented space.3" The Court emphasized that the officers
had not physically trespassed on the defendant's property nor entered his
house or offices because the actual tap occurred on the street adjacent to
the office building.31 The Court stated that the agents could not violate
the fourth amendment "unless there had been an official search and
seizure of [his person, papers, or effects] or an actual physical invasion of
his house or 'curtilage' for the purpose of making a seizure."2 Finally,
the Court concluded that a person who installs a telephone intends "to
project his voice to those quite outside" his curtilage and that wire
outside the defendant's home and the messages on the wires did not fall
under the fourth amendment's protection.33 At the same time, though,
the Court recognized that Congress could prohibit the admissibility of
intercepted phone messages in federal criminal trials.34
Following Olmstead, the Court reaffirmed its application of the physi-
cal invasion requirement. 35 For instance, in Goldman v. U.S.,36 federal
agents attached a "detectaphone" to the outside wall of the defendant's
office to hear conversations therein. The agents legally occupied the of-
fice adjacent to the defendants'. When the defendant spoke in his office,
the sound waves from his voice caused the common wall between the
offices to vibrate. The detectaphone amplified these vibrations, enabling
the agents to hear the defendant's conversation. 37 The defendant argued
that because he intended to keep his conversation private and did not
intend to project his voice "beyond the four walls of the room," he conse-
quently did not assume the risk of anyone hearing his voice.38 The court
30. Id. at 469.
31. Id. at 464.
32. Id. at 466.
33. In explaining this holding, the Court declared that the phone-tapping did not constitute a
seizure because the officers had not "physically" removed any evidence. "The evidence was secured
by the use of the sense of hearing and that only." Id. at 464 & 466.
34. Id. at 465.
35. On Lee v. U.S., 343 U.S. 747, 751 (1952) (no fourth amendment violation when undercover
agent entered defendant's business with a hidden microphone because no trespass); Clinton v. Vir-
ginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (penetration the depth of a thumbtack into a physical structure is a
physical intrusion sufficient to violate the fourth amendment).
36. 316 U.S. 129 (1942). The agents had not physically invaded the premises. Id. at 130-32.
37. Id. at 130-32.
38. Id. at 135.
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rejected this argument, however, and held that the use of the detecta-
phone did not violate the fourth amendment because the agents had not
physically entered the defendant's office.39
By contrast, in Silverman v. U.S.' the Court held that police officers
had violated the fourth amendment when they surreptitiously overheard
the defendant's conversations without a search warrant.4 The officers
legally occupied the house adjacent to the defendant's in a series of row
houses. The officers then placed a microphone through a crevice in the
party wall between the buildings thereby contacting the heating duct in
the defendant's house.42 The heating duct transmitted conversations
from all over the house to the officers' microphone.43 Justice Stewart's
opinion held that the use of the heating ducts inside the house created an
unconstitutional physical invasion,' but he nonetheless recognized that
electronic paraphernalia would soon require the Court to reexamine the
Olmstead rule.45
While requiring a physical invasion, the Supreme Court also used the
"plain view" rule to limit curtilage protection. In its broadest sense the
rule allows governmental officials to observe without a search warrant all
39. Id. Justice Murphy dissented and argued that the Court should have overruled Olmstead.
Id. at 136-42. He found no sound basis to distinguish the stringent protections offered for mailed
messages and the less restrictive rules governing oral communications. Id. at 141.
40. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
41. Id. at 511.
42. Id. at 506.
43. Sound waves travel very well through hollow tubes. Therefore, the vents in each room of
the defendant's house transmitted the conversation in the particular room into the duct work. The
officers could thereby hear any conversation in the house which occurred near a heating vent. Id. at
507.
44. Id. at 511. A comparison of Olmstead and Silverman shows the difficulty (indeed absurd-
ity) of applying a test based on physical invasion. The police officers "seized" spoken words in both
cases. In Olmstead, the defendant spoke thus transmitting sound waves through the air. These
sound waves collided with the inside surface of the wall causing the wall to vibrate. The agents,
using a dictaphone, simply monitored the vibrations which were measurable at the outside surface.
See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
Likewise, in Silverman, the spoken word created a sound wave, a portion of which transmitted
through the air inside the heating duct. Because of the rigidity of the walls of the heating duct, the
sound wave did not disperse as quickly as it otherwise would have in free space. This sound wave
collided with the inside surface of the duct causing the outside surface of the duct to vibrate. The
officers then monitored these vibrations from a legally occupied position. See supra notes 40-43 and
accompanying text. In both cases the vibrations, which the soundwaves created, transmitted infor-
mation outside the physical boundaries of the structure. In both cases, mechanisms internal to the
structure transmitted the information. From the standpoint of physics, the intrusions were identical.
See P. TIPLER, PHYsics 396-471 (2d ed. 1982).
45. Id. at 508-09.
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things which a curious passerby might observe.46 The rule has allowed
officers to illuminate the inside of a barn with a flashlight while standing
outside,47 to peer through a gap in garage doors,48 and to observe with
binoculars from a helicopter.49
Additionally, a corollary of the plain view rule, the "open fields" doc-
trine, authorizes officials to observe activities occurring outside a dwell-
ing or its curtilage and to enter and search such an area without probable
cause or a search warrant.5 0 The Court announced the doctrine in Hester
v. U.S.." In Hester, federal agents observed the defendant's dwelling and
physically invaded and seized whiskey from the land immediately adja-
cent to the defendant's dwelling.52 The court held that the officials had
seized the whiskey in an "open field" which the fourth amendment did
not protect. 5
3
B. Enlargement of the Fourth Amendment Protections:
The Katz Doctrine
As electronic surveillance technology advanced, the Supreme Court
voiced concern whether its decisions requiring physical intrusions for
fourth amendment violations were affording sufficient protection to indi-
viduals from governmental searches. 4 In Katz v. U.S.," the Court, de-
46. James v. U.S., 418 F.2d 1150, 1151 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
47. United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134 (1987).
48. U.S. v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, Wright v. U.S., 405 U.S. 947 (1971).
49. State v. Stachler, 58 Haw. 412, 570 P.2d 1323 (1977) (police observation with helicopter
and binoculars is not a search since target in plain view). See also People v. Hicks, 49 Ill. App. 3d
421, 364 N.E.2d 440 (1977) (police observation through undrawn curtains upheld, even though de-
fendant had twice closed them while officers were watching with binoculars); Jessee v. State, 640
P.2d 56, reh'g denied, 643 P.2d 681 (Wyo. 1982) (officers can look through windows and walk
through a door that was flapping in the wind); U.S. v. Arredondo-Hernandez, 574 F.2d 1312 (5th
Cir. 1978) (plain view rule applies to parked truck).
50. Oliver v. U. S., 466 U.S. 170 (1984) See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
51. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
52. Revenue officers were watching the defendant's house from a remote location. When the
defendant came out of his house and picked up a jug of whiskey, the officers revealed themselves,
pursued the defendant, and seized the jug when he dropped it. The officers also seized a bottle of
whiskey which one of the defendant's customers had thrown away during the pursuit. Id. at 58.
53. Justice Holmes based his opinion on the lack of protection given to the areas surrounding a
dwelling at common law. Id. at 59. See also supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text. But see
Allinder v. State, 808 F.2d 1180, 1185 (6th Cir. 1987) (open fields doctrine limited to sights, seizure
without warrant violates fourth amendment).
54. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 47 (1967) ("sophisticated electronic devices have now
been developed... which are capable of eavesdropping on anyone in almost any given situation").
Washington University Open Scholarship
118 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 66:111
claring that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,"56
rearticulated its standard for protecting persons from illegal electronic
surveillance. In Katz, FBI agents had attached a listening and recording
device to the top of a phone booth in which the defendant placed illegal
wagers.5 7 Although the device did not penetrate the structure, the court
found a fourth amendment violation. The Court stated that "[o]ne who
occupies [a phone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll
that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the
words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world.""8
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz set forth a two part test
which has become the standard for fourth amendment search and seizure
analysis.59 The first part asks whether "a person [has] exhibited an ac-
tual expectation of privacy."'  The second part questions whether "the
expectation [is] one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reason-
able' "61 Before an individual can claim any violation of his fourth
See Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970s, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
1003, 1005-10 (1966);
55. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
56. Id. at 351 & 353.
57. Id. at 348.
58. Id. at 352.
59. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
60. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). This subjective inquiry determines whether
the defendant took precautions against the form of surveillance used or otherwise believed that the
type of surveillance used would not successfully occur. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98
(1980) (ten foot fence gives subjective expectation of privacy from street level surveillance).
61. This objective inquiry, based on societal norms, determines the reasonableness of a defend-
ant's expectation of privacy. See, eg., Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (no objectively reasonable
privacy interest over plot of ground located one mile from dwelling).
The plain view doctrine still applies under Katz because one could not reasonably maintain an
objective expectation of privacy toward an action or event occurring in the plain view of the public.
See, eg., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). In U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), narcot-
ics officers placed a "beeper" inside a container of chloroform which the defendant purchased. (A
"beeper" is a radio transmitter which intermittently sends signals detectable by a receiver located at
a distance from the beeper.) When the defendant drove away, officers followed him but eventually
lost visual contact. Using the beeper, however, the officers located the defendant's destination.
Upon getting a search warrant based on probable cause from the observations of the defendant's
dwelling, the officers searched it. Id. at 278. The Court reasoned that the defendant possessed no
objective expectation of privacy as to where he drove his car because someone potentially could have
viewed him. Id. at 281-82. The Court held that the use of the beeper did not violate the fourth
amendment. Id.
On the other hand, in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984), the use of a beeper violated the
fourth amendment. In Karo, agents installed a beeper in a container of chloroform which the de-
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amendment rights, he must show both expectations. 2
Katz represented a major policy change in that the Court expressly
repudiated any physical entry prerequisite for fourth amendment viola-
tions.6" Thus the Katz test maintained the protections the Court had
recognized in prior cases under the curtilage doctrine" while shielding
situations which would not have received protection under the "physical
intrusion" standard.65
While Katz appeared to focus on the expectations of searched parties
and society in general, the Supreme Court has continued to use the curti-
fendant ultimately transported to a cabin. Id. at 708. As in Knotts, the Court found no fourth
amendment violation in the use of the beeper for identifying the defendant's cabin. Id. at 713-14.
The agents, though, had supported the affidavit for the search warrant on their knowledge that the
can of chloroform sat inside the cabin. Id. at 710 & 714. Because they could not see the chloroform
from outside the cabin and because the agents never saw anyone carry the chloroform into the cabin,
the agents could not rely on the plain view doctrine for their knowledge of the chloroform's location.
Id. at 715-16. The beeper, therefore, allowed them to identify an item inside the cabin. Id. This
identification constituted an illegal search. The affidavit supporting the warrant rested on an illegal
search, thus making the search pursuant to the warrant illegal. Id. at 721. See also Smith v. Mary-
land, 442 U.S. 735. (1979) (use of a pen register is not an illegal search because the defendant dialed
the phone numbers in the plain view of the phone company).
62. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 112 (1980).
63. The Court held that the absence of physical penetration into the defendant's phone booth
possessed "no constitutional significance." Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. The Court also declared that "the
reach of [the fourth] amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion
into any given enclosure." Id.
64. In theory, the curtilage doctrine would dictate the same result which the Court reached in
Katz. Still, some courts have ignored the curtilage/open fields elements in their Katz analysis focus-
ing only on Harlan's expectations analysis. See, eg., State v. Douglas, 365 N.W. 2d 580 (Wis. 1985)
(no fourth amendment protection from nonconsensual warrantless search of defendant's house and
bedroom); United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982) (no fourth amendment protection
from warrantless monitoring of a beeper in a cabin); State v. Wood, 617 P.2d 568 (1980) (no fourth
amendment protection from search of seventh floor apartment with binoculars); People v. Sirhan, 7
Cal. 3d. 710, 744, 497 P.2d 1121, 1143, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 408 (1972) (no fourth amendment
protection from removal of a letter from a box of trash in defendant's backyard).
As a practical matter, a defendant who proves that the observed activity occurred within his
curtilage has satisfied the subjective leg of Katz and, absent the plain view exception, has satisfied the
objective probe. E.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (surveillance within curtilage vio-
lated subjective expectation of privacy, but plain view rule defeated reasonable objective
expectation).
65. Certainly the FBI agents in Katz would not have violated the defendant's fourth amend-
ment rights under the Olmstead or Goldman holdings. As in Olmstead, the agents in Katz had not
physically removed any evidence. They had used their sense of hearing only. See supra note 33 and
accompanying text. Additionally, because the device in Katz did not penetrate the booth it was quite
similar to the detectaphone in Silverman. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. In essence,
Katz represented a movement away from an analysis of "constitutionally protected areas" towards a
general examination of the reasonable expectations of a person to remain free from undetected sur-
veillance. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 n.9 & 359.
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lage and open field doctrines as a framework for analysis. Thus, in
United States v. Dunn,66 the Court outlined four factors for determining
the existence of a curtilage. The four factors included: 1) the proximity
of the area to the home, 2) whether an enclosure surrounding the home
also enclosed the area, 3) the nature of the claimant's use of the area, and
4) whether the resident had taken steps to protect the area from observa-
tion.67 Applying these factors in Dunn, the Court ruled that a barn lo-
cated sixty yards from a farmhouse and in which the defendant
manufactured illegal drugs stood outside the curtilage. 68 This ruling sub-
jected the barn to the open fields rule.69 Therefore, when officers ob-
served the contents of the barn without a warrant and without entering
it, they did not violate the fourth amendment.70
Furthermore, in Oliver v. U.S.,7 the Court expressly affirmed the open
fields doctrine.72 The Court ruled that police did not violate the fourth
amendment when, acting on a tip, they walked a distance over one mile
on the defendant's property past several obstructions and discovered a
well-hidden marijuana patch.7 3 Having used the visual evidence col-
lected from the trip to show probable cause, the police obtained a valid
search warrant and prosecuted the defendant.74
66. 107 S. Ct. 1134 (1987).
67. Id. at 1139. These factors offer useful analytical tools only to the extent that they bear upon
the "centrally relevant consideration-whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home
itself that it should be placed under the home's 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment protection." Id.
68. Id. at 1140. Specifically, the Court found: 1) the barn stood 60 yards from the farmhouse
and 50 yards from the fence around the farmhouse; 2) the barn was outside the fence around the
house; 3) the defendant manufactured illegal drugs in the barn, not an intimate activity of the home;
and 4) the defendant did little to protect the barn from observation by people standing in the open
fields around the barn.
69. Under Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170 (1984) and Hester v. U.S., 265 U.S. 57 (1924), the Court
found no constitutional difference between police observations conducted while in a public place and
while standing in open fields. 107 S. Ct. at 1141. See supra notes 50-53 and infra notes 71-74 and
accompanying text.
70. 107 S. Ct. at 1141.
71. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
72. Id. at 176, 178. Quoting Holmes' opinion in Hester, the Court stated, "[Tihe special protec-
tion accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,'
is not extended to the open fields." Id. at 178, (quoting Hester, 265 U.S. at 59). The Court held that
an expectation of privacy in one's open fields was not reasonable. It also explicitly rejected use of a
case-by-case approach for determining when the fourth amendment might protect some open fields.
Id. at 183.
73. To get to the marijuana patch, officers walked one mile and en route passed a locked gate,
several fences, and several "No Trespassing" signs. Woods, fences, and embankments bounded the
patch on all sides so that no one could see it from any point of public access. Id. at 173-74.
74. Id. at 174.
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II. CALIFORNIA v. CIRAOLO And Dow CHEMICAL V U.S.: A NEW
STANDARD FOR DETERMINING OBJECTIVE
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY?
In two separate cases in 1986 the Supreme Court appeared to create a
more stringent analysis for determining under Katz75 whether society
would objectively recognize a party's subjective expectation of privacy.
In California v. Ciraolo,76 police officers observed, with the naked eye,
the defendant's fenced-in backyard from an airplane. They had received
an anonymous tip that the defendant was growing marijuana in his back-
yard. The flyover confirmed the tip.77 They used their visual evidence to
show probable cause for a search warrant .7  A divided Court held that
the police had not violated the defendant's fourth amendment rights dur-
ing the flyover because they had gathered evidence in "plain view."'7 9
Applying the Katz test, the court conceded that the fenced-in backyard
fell within the curtilage wherein the defendant had a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy. 0 The Court held, however, that the defendant did not
enjoy an objective expectation of privacy," because airplane flights were
"routine" and "[a]ny member of the public.., who glanced down could
have seen everything that [the] officers observed." 2 Further, the officials
gathered the evidence in a "physically nonintrusive manner." 3 Thus,
under the plain view rule, the police had not violated the fourth
amendment. 84
75. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
76. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
77. Id. at 209.
78. Based on his observations from the plane, the officer got a search warrant for the defend-
ant's backyard. Id. at 209-10.
79. Id. at 215.
80. The defendant possessed a subjective expectation of privacy because he built a ten foot fence
around his backyard. Id. at 213.
81. Id. at 214.
82. Id. at 213-14.
83. Id. at 213.
84. Id. at 215. The Court cited Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), for the proposition
that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Id. at 351. See supra notes 57-58 for a detailed discus-
sion of the facts in Katz).
Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, dissented in Ciraolo. The
dissent argued that Katz had made the presence or absence of an official's physical trespass constitu-
tionally irrelevant. 476 U.S. at 223. The opinion noted that people who fence in their residential
lawns do not "knowingly expose" their activity by failing to build barriers that prevent aerial surveil-
lance. Id. at 224. Furthermore, Justice Powell thought that passengers on a commercial flight or in
1988]
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In the second case, Dow Chemical Co. v. U.S. ,85 Dow owned a 2000-
acre facility which an extensive ground level and aerial security program
protected.86  The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requested
that Dow allow it to enter the site for certain inspections. Dow refused.
87
The EPA then hired a mapmaker who took aerial photographs of Dow's
facility with a mapping camera.88 The Court held that the EPA's activi-
ties had not violated Dow's fourth amendment rights.8 9
An indication in Dow that the Court was drifting away from Katz was
that although both lower courts had applied the Katz test,90 the Supreme
Court failed to mention Katz in its analysis.91 However, the Court de
private planes were not likely to observe the defendant's private activity. Accordingly, the defendant
held a privacy interest in his backyard which society would consider reasonable. Id. at 223-25.
85. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
86. Id. at 229. The district court found that Dow had implemented an extensive ground level
security program composed of the following measures: A chain link fence around the facility, closed
circuit television surveillance of entrance and exit gates, alarm systems, roving patrols, employee
identification badges, restrictions on visitors, and 24-hour security personnel. Dow Chemical Co. v.
U.S. By and Through Gorsuch, 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1364-65 (E.D. Mich. 1982). This program
prevented ground level searches. Id. at 1366. Dow's aerial security program monitored overflights
and, by checking airplane numbers at local airports, prevented dissemination of any photographs
taken of the plant during the overflight. Overall, Dow spent at least $3.25 million in each of the ten
previous years on security. Id. at 1365. Two issues in Dow which this Note does not consider are:
1) whether the surveillance of Dow's facility infringed on Dow's protected trade secrets, and 2)
whether the Environmental Protection Agency had the administrative power to conduct the war-
rantless surveillance.
87. 476 U.S. at 229. The EPA made one on-site inspection in September 1977. 536 F. Supp. at
1357. 'When the EPA requested a second visit in December, 1977 to inspect the power houses and
take some photographs, Dow refused the request. The EPA then hired the mapmaker to take the
photographs from the air. Id.
88. 476 U.S. at 229. The camera used, a Wild RC-10, cost $22,000. Its manufacturer described
the camera as the "finest precision aerial camera available." 536 F. Supp. at 1357 n.2. The
mapmaker mounted the camera in a twin engine Beachcraft airplane to achieve the necessary photo-
graphic stability. Id. After enlargement, one could discern pipes as small as one-half inch in diame-
ter. Id. The mapmaker photographed areas surrounded by buildings and other structures, which at
ground level an inspector probably would not see. Id. The district court determined that ... the
camera saw a great deal more than the human eye could ever see." Id. at 1367.
89. 476 U.S. at 239.
90. Dow Chemical Co. v. U.S., 749 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1984) ("Katz must be discussed for
Katz defines in terms of privacy interests what a search is for fourth amendment purposes"); Dow
Chemical Co. v. U.S., 536 F. Supp. 1355, 1363 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (the Katz test is the prevailing
formulation for evaluating the legality of a search).
91. The majority only mentioned Katz one time in its explanation of the district court's holding.
476 U.S. at 230. Chief Justice Burger, who wrote both Dow and Ciraolo, mentioned Katz seven times
in Ciraolo while applying the Katz test. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211-15 (1986). On the
other hand, the dissent in Dow directly applied the Katz test and found a fourth amendment viola-
tion. 476 U.S. at 252. See infra note 97.
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facto applied the Katz test and found no fourth amendment violation.92
The Court reasoned that Dow could not hold an objective expectation of
privacy because mapmakers commonly used the camera and airplane.
Thus, anyone with the equipment could have duplicated the photo-
graphs. 93 The Court noted that just as technological developments in
photography had improved industrial processes, so had they "enhanced
law enforcement techniques." 94 The Court, therefore, viewed the narrow
issue as whether "aerial observation of a 2000-acre outdoor manufactur-
ing facility without physical entry" was an unconstitutional search and
seizure.95 In ruling that the EPA had acted legally, the court empha-
sized that the EPA had never physically intruded onto Dow's property96
and intimated that it would have reached a different result if the EPA
had physically invaded the facility.97
Read in conjunction, Ciraolo and Dow apparently have established a
two-part test for determining whether a person possesses an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy. First, the Court will examine whether
the surveillance type in question is so common that members of the pub-
lic generally have access to it or know of it.98 Second, the Court will
determine whether officials physically intruded into a complainant's pri-
92. Under the guise of a curtilage/open fields analysis, the Court repeatedly examined the rea-
sonableness of Dow's subjective/objective expectation of privacy. This is the Katz test. 476 U.S. at
235-37.
93. Id. at 231.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 237.
96. The Court mentioned five times that lack of physical entry was an important factor. Id. at
237-38, 239 n.7.
97. Id. at 237. As in Ciraolo, Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Black-
mun, dissented. He argued that the majority's reliance in Dow on an absence of a physical entry and
on the method of surveillance repudiated Katz. Id. at 247. He also distinguished Ciraolo on the
theory that a passenger on an airplane could not have seen the details which the photographs cap-
tured. Id. at 249-50. The dissent considered the majority's determination of whether Dow's plant
was a curtilage or an open field inapposite and irrelevant. Justice Powell noted that Dow never
argued that its interest in the plant equalled that of a homeowner in his curtilage. However, he
argued that Dow's security program clearly showed it held a privacy interest in its plant which
removed it from the open fields. Id. at 250-51. Applying Katz, then, the dissent would have held
that Dow held a subjective and a reasonable objective expectation of privacy. Id. at 249-52.
98. In Ciraolo the Court remarked that "[a]ny member of the public.., who glanced down
could have seen everything that [the] officers observed." California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14
(1986. In Dow the Court ruled that the company did not hold a reasonably objective expectation of
privacy in part because "[a]ny person with an airplane on aerial camera could readily duplicate [the
photographs]." 476 U.S. at 231. The public's access to the surveillance technique, therefore, al-
lowed governmental officials to use the techniques without warrants.
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vate area.99 To determine the extent of the private area the Court will
use the curtilage and open fields doctrines. Later cases interpreting
Ciraolo and Dow have generally followed this trend."° However, these
interpretations seem inconsistent with Katz in which the Court moved its
fourth amendment analysis from a consideration of constitutionally pro-
tected areas to a fundamental consideration of privacy interests in-
dependent of technology."'
III. OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968
A rise in organized crime and the development of surreptitious surveil-
lance technologies caught the attention of the President, Congress, and
the Supreme Court during the 1960s. In response, the President ordered
a commission to study the problem, 102 Congress feverishly drafted new
legislation,1 03 and the Supreme Court decided a landmark case. 1" These
efforts culminated in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 19681"' which Congress designed to protect private per-
99. In Ciraolo the Court observed that the officers had gathered the evidence in a "physically
nonintrusive manner." 476 U.S. at 213. In Dow the Court repeatedly stated Dow's claim concerned
observation without physical entry. 476 U.S. at 237-38, 239 n.7. Further, Ciraolo found an invasion
of a curtilage but found no fourth amendment violation, in part because no physical entry occurred.
The Dow Court's repeated reference to physical entry further suggests the renewed importance of a
physical entry requirement in fourth amendment analysis. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying
text.
100. See, eg., United States v. Bassford, 812 F.2d 16, 19 (Ist Cir. 1987) (upholding aerial search
because any member of.the public flying at 1000 feet could have seen what the officers observed);
United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987) (requiring search warrant for govern.
ment's use of video camera to examine defendants yard even though a casual observer could have
seen the yard; refusing to extend Ciraolo) United States v. Echegosen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1275 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1986) (Ciraolo upheld validity of aerial searches); United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849,
856 (9th Cir. 1986) (Ciraolo holds that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial
observation made in navigable public airspace). See also Bissonette v. Haig, 800 F.2d 812, 815 (8th
Cir. 1986) (if the airplane in Dow had not been in lawful airspace, a fourth amendment violation
would have occurred); (requiring search warrant for government's use of video camera to examine
defendant's yard even though a casual observer could have seen the yard; refusing to extend Ciraolo);
People v. Sabo, 185 Cal. App.3d 845, 854, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170, 176 (4th Dist. 1986), cert. denied, 197
S. Ct. 2200 (1987) (aerial surveillance from a helicopter in nonnavigable airspace violates fourth
amendment).
101. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-53.
102. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967). See Note, The Admissibility of
Evidence Obtained by Eavesdropping on Cordless Telephone Conversations, 86 COL. L. REV. 323,
333-34 (1986).
103. See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
104. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
105. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1982)).
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sons from oral and wire interceptions by both government and private
actors. 10
6
A. Legislative History of Title III
Senator Hruska introduced The Electronic Surveillance Control Act of
1967 (E.S.C.A.) 107 to prohibit private individuals from stealing trade
secrets and other vital information via interception of oral and wire com-
munications. At the same time, Senator McClellan introduced the Fed-
eral Wire Interception Act (F.W.I.A.)'1 8 to safeguard individuals from
unauthorized governmental interceptions of wire conversations and other
oral communication. While the Congress was developing E.S.C.A. and
F.W.I.A., the Supreme Court decided Katz.'0 9 The Senate incorporated
the Katz framework into a piece of legislation which combined E.S.C.A.
and F.W.I.A.: Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 (Title III).1 0
B. Text
While Title III specifically protects wire,' oral, 1 2 and electronic
communications," 3 this Note focuses solely on oral communications.
Section 2510(2)114 defines "oral communication" as: "any oral commu-
nication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such commu-
106. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2520 (1982 & Supp. 1987). The provisions regulating private activity
arose out of a fear of organized crime. In reporting to the President on Title III, Senator McClellan
stated, "[T]he greatest danger to America today is not from without; the greatest danger to America
at this hour is the lawlessness, the violence, and the organized crime that prevails within." 114
CONG. REC. 14469 (1968).
107. S. 2050, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REc. 18007 (1967). See also Note, The Admissi-
bility of Evidence Obtained by Eavesdropping on Cordless Telephone Conversations, 86 COL. L. REV.
323, 340-41 nn.124 & 131 (1986) (oral communication protected if the objective and subjective com-
ponents of the Katz test met); Note, Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace: The Need for Stan-
dards, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 438, 444-48 (1984) (definition of oral communication incorporates
the "Justifiable expectation of privacy" concept found in Katz).
108. S. 675, 90th Cong., Ist Sess., 113 CONG. Rc. 1491 (1967).
109. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
110. Publ. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2510-20 (1982)).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (Supp. 1987) (wire communications defined as any oral transfer via
facilities for the transmission of communications by wire or cable but specifically excludes cordless
telephones).
112. Id. § 2510(2).
113. Id. § 2510(2) (electronic communications defined as any transfer of data or other informa-
tion but excludes cordless telephones, wire or oral communications, tone-only paging devices, and
tracking devices).
114. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2).
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nication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying
such expectation. . ." The legislative history115 and the plain text of Title
111116 demonstrate that Congress intended that its definition of "oral
communication" would incorporate the Katz standard set out by Justice
Harlan. Lower courts interpreting Title III have always applied the two
prong subjective/objective inquiry.117
Sections 2511(a) and (b) prohibit any person from intercepting or en-
deavoring to intercept any oral communications by the use of any elec-
tronic, mechanical, or other devices."' Sections 2511(c) and (d) prohibit
any person from intentionally disclosing or using or endeavoring to dis-
close or to use the intercepted contents of an oral communication.' 19
The "any person" in section 2511 is defined to restrict both governmental
and private activity.1 20  Violators of section 2511 are subject to varying
fines and up to five years in prison.121
115. In explaining the amendments by which it developed Title III, the Senate reported that
"[the proposed legislation [Title III] conforms to the constitutional standards set out in... Katz v.
U.S." S.R. 1097 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 2112,
2113 (citations omitted). The report also stated that the § 2510(2) definition of "oral communica-
tions" "is intended to reflect existing law. See Katz v. U.S." Id. at 2178. In his report to the
President on Title III, Senator McClellan stated that "Title III was drafted to... conform with Katz
v. U.S." 114 CONG. Rac. 14469, (1968). In response to a question from Senator Lausche regarding
the powers within Title III to stop private searches or to grant governmental search warrants, Mc-
Clellan responded: "I may say that every safeguard, in keeping with what the Supreme Court has
said in the most recent cases, would be required. Every constitutional safeguard has been placed in
[Title 111]." 114 CONG. REc. 14469 (1968).
116. The definition of "oral communication" is no more than the subjective/objective inquiry
found in the Katz test. See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
117. One court stated:
The [Title III] standards are to be construed strictly, because Congress knew that it was
creating an investigative mechanism which potentially threatened the constitutional right
to privacy, and it carefully wrote into the law the protective procedures for the issuance of
warrants which the Supreme Court had declared in Katz v. US. and Berger v. New York.
U.S. v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267 (2d. Cir. 1974) (citations omitted). See U.S. v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413,
426 (1977) ("S.917 [Title III] was then redrafted to conform to Katz as well as Berger.. ."); U.S. v.
Figueroa, 757 F.2d 466, 471 (2d Cir. 1985) (Title III enacted to meet restrictions of Berger and
Katz); U.S. v. McIntyre, 582 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1978) (the legislative history behind
§ 2510(2) of Title III reflects Congress' intent that Katz serve as a guide to define communications
that are uttered under circumstances justifying an expectation of privacy); U.S. v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d
633, 643 (2d Cir. 1977) (statutory requirements carefully tailored to meet constitutional require-
ments set out in Berger and Katz).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(a) & (b) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(c) & (d).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(b) (Title III regulates any "person" who is defined to be "an employee, or
agent of the United States or any state or political subdivision thereof, and any individual, partner-
ship, association, joint stock company, trust, or corporation.").
121. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4) & (5).
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Section 2512 is directed against the shipping, distribution, manufac-
ture and advertisement of wire and oral communication interception de-
vices.1 22  Section 2512(l)(a) prohibits any person from sending any
electronic, mechanical, or other device through the mail or in interstate
commerce if the person knows or has reason to know that the design of
the device renders it primarily useful for the surreptitious interception of
oral communications.' 23 Section 2512(l)(b) further proscribes the manu-
facture and sale of such devices.' 24 Section 2512(1)(c) prohibits all news-
paper and magazine advertisement of such devices. 125 Finally, violators
of section 2512 are subject to a maximum penalty of a $10,000 fine and
five years in prison. 126
Perhaps the most important aspect of Title III is the stringent proce-
dures government officials must follow before they can have authority to
intercept, disclose, and use the contents of an oral communication.127
Section 2515 effectively enforces these procedural protections by requir-
ing the suppression of all evidence collected in violation of Title 111.128
For these procedural protections to take effect, however, there must first
be an "oral communication" within section 2510(2) of Title III. That is,
a person must possess subjective and an objective expectation that his
communication is not subject to interception. 129 Persons who fail to
show such an oral communication have no Title III protections from
surreptitious interception and most likely have no fourth amendment
122. 18 U.S.C. § 2512.
123. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(a).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(l)(b).
125. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(c).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1). Interestingly, all of the prosecutions under Title III to date have been
for the mailing, selling or advertising of tiny microphone combinations or wire tapping devices. See
U.S. v. Pritchard, 745 F.2d 1112, 1114-16 (7th Cir. 1984) (hidden microphones, transmitters, and
receivers; larger phonetapping equipment); U.S. v. Schweihs, 569 F.2d 965, 967 (5th Cir. 1978)
(phone tapping equipment); U.S. v. Bast, 495 F.2d 138, 139-41 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (tiny microphone
and recorder combination); U.S. v. Wynn, 633 F. Supp. 595, 598 (C.D. Ill. 1986) (drop-in telephone
microphone with transmitter and recorder). Although larger parabolic microphones fall within the
clear proscription of § 2512 and although their advertisement, sale and use is undisputed, parabolic
microphones have not prompted any prosecutions to date. This is rather anomalous when one con-
siders the degree of intrusion of which parabolic microphones are capable. See infra note 143 (ex-
plaining how one writer regularly eavesdrops on the public with a "Big Ear" he purchased through a
catalogue).
127. See 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (Supp. 1987). See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (Supp. 1987). See Note, The Suppression Sanction in the Federal Elec-
tronic Surveillance Statute, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 707 (1985) See also WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra
note 1, at 312-314.
129. See supra note 115-17 and accompanying text.
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protection either. 130
IV. THE IMPACT OF CIRAOLO AND Dow ON TITLE III
Although Title III on its face protects oral communications from any
"electronic, mechanical, or other device," Congress incorporated the
Katz standard for determining when an oral communicator could possess
a legitimate, reasonable expectation of privacy.' 3 1 Thus, the oral com-
municator must first establish an objective expectation under the statute
that no one will intercept the communication. 132 If the Supreme Court
applies the reasonable objective expectation analysis it delineated in
Ciraolo and Dow to oral communications under Title III, then the proce-
dural protections of the Act could become irrelevant.' 33 This is because
the public availability/physical entry standard would allow persons using
well-known nonintrusive devices to intercept oral communications
freely.' 34
At the time the Supreme Court decided Katz and Congress incorpo-
rated Katz into Title III, Congress felt that it had provided a framework
that would protect privacy interests from new technology. '3  Ciraolo
and Dow reverted back to an analysis which allows the unwarranted uses
of known technology. 136
130. Title III protections are not triggered until the subject can show that the intercepted com-
munication was an "oral communication" within § 2510(2). If the subject cannot prove an objective
expectation of privacy, then no "oral communication" will exist and, therefore, no Title III protec-
tion will exist either. Likewise, an objective expectation of privacy is necessary to prove that tradi-
tional fourth amendment rights exist. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 9-11 & 75-97 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 115.
136. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text. See Saltzburg, Another Victim ofillegal
Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (As Illustrated by the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 PiTr. L. REv. 1
(1986) (suggesting that the move from Katz began with Oliver). But see Comment, Dow Chemical
and Ciraolo: For Government Investigators the Sky's No Limit, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 667 (1987).
One commentator has found that Ciraolo and Dow "signal an important narrowing of the protec-
tion of privacy," but determined that the narrowing occurred consistent with the philosophy of Katz
Id. at 669. Accordingly, the two decisions merely clarify what a defendant must show to satisfy the
Katz test. Id. at 691.
Under the subjective leg, this commentator determined that now one must take effective action
against the type of surveillance used. Id. at 692. The author suggested that the defendants in
Ciraolo and Dow should have planted trees. Id. at 694. This is consistent with Katz because the
defendant in Katz only had a subjective interest with respect to his conversation. The defendant did
not have a subjective interest as to his identity, which was observable through the glass phone booth
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V. A PROPOSAL FOR LIMITING THE IMPACT OF CIRAoLo/DOW
In order to give effect to the Congressional intent behind Title 111,137
the federal courts should limit the Ciraolo/Dow public availabil-
ity/physical intrusion standard. The courts may do so by distinguishing
between visual surveillance and oral communication interceptions or by
limiting the case holdings strictly to their facts.
Future courts may distinguish visual surveillance from the intercep-
tion of oral communication in their fourth amendment analysis and al-
low more intrusive visual searches.' 38 In Dow the Court suggested this
distinction.13 9 The relaxed Ciraolo/Dow standard would allow the con-
tinued use of developing technologies for visual surveillance in law en-
forcement. The heightened Katz test would continue to protect oral
communications from technological developments pursuant to Title III.
This dual standard of fourth amendment analysis, however, would fail to
address satisfactorily the issue of when an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy. This is because analysis of fourth amendment
rights would proceed according to the manner of intrusion rather than
an individual's or society's expectations of privacy. 40
doors. Id. at 692. The commentator found that the objective leg has become a balancing test of
several factors: the protection given to the situation historically, the government's interest in stop-
ping crime, the type of search, the amount of concealment, and the public access to the area. Id. at
696-98. Applying those factors, the commentator decided that the Court reached the correct conclu-
sion.
The problem with the comment is that it severely weakens Katz. Under the subjective leg, one
must foresee the type of surveillance and then take effective precautions against it, no matter the cost.
This could become unrealistic as technology progresses. See infra notes 142-48 and accompanying
text. Further, the commentator incorrectly stated that Ciraolo had no subjective expectation of pri-
vacy. Id. at 687-88. In fact, the Court did find Ciraolo had a subjective expectation of privacy.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). Therefore, contrary to the comment's requirement,
future suspects need not take effective action against the surveillance for there to be a subjective
expectation of privacy. Under the objective leg, the government's interest in stopping crime should
not be a factor. The purpose of the fourth amendment is to restrict zealous officers. The desire to
catch one guilty person should not trample the rights of innocent people.
137. See supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.
138. This distinction is inherently suspect because one can invade another's privacy interests
with either visual or oral techniques.
139. After holding that aerial surveillance with the mapping camera did not constitute a search,
the Court distinguished oral interceptions by stating that "[ain electronic device to penetrate walls or
windows so as to hear and record confidential discussions of chemical formulae or other trade secrets
would raise very different and far more serious questions." Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476
U.S. 227, 239 (1986). The Court did not persuasively draw this distinction, as it acknowledged in
analyzing the aerial surveillance that plant layouts were trade secrets susceptible to photographic
"recording." Id. at 232.
140. As the dissent in Ciraolo and Dow explained, analysis of fourth amendment rights by the
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Futhermore, as a practical matter, courts which base the existence of a
fourth amendment violation upon whether the officers used a publicly
available level of technology or whether the manner of intrusion involved
physical entry would be drawing an absurd distinction."' This distinc-
tion is absurd because, first, the level of technology is irrelevant because
technology continues to advance. The common airplanes and cameras of
today would have been high technology one hundred years ago. Indeed,
a brief consideration of presently developing technologies suggests the
types of devices that will be "publicly available" in the near future. For
instance, television sports broadcasts routinely use parabolic micro-
phones to detect sounds from the playing field. Mathematicians have
understood the theory of this device for several hundred years142 and the
microphones are currently available to the public. 143 This same technol-
ogy can intercept private conversations from great distances. 144 Apply-
ing the public availability/physical entry standard, no one could hold a
reasonable expectation of privacy from the use of a parabolic microphone
because of their availability and because they do not physically intrude.
Thus, none of the stringent procedural protections of Title III would ever
be triggered. This result would contradict Congress' declared purpose to
protect persons and not places.14 5
Technology has advanced in other areas as well. The past twenty
years have seen the development and use of laser equipment which en-
ables the operator to hear conversations occurring behind closed win-
dows ("lasersnooper"). 146  With the rapid developments in computer
"manner" of the intrusion will erode fourth amendment protection as technology advances. 476
U.S. at 240.
141. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
142. E. SWOKOWSKI, CALCULUS WITH ANALYTIC GEOMETRY 707 (2d ed. 1979).
143. Bumiller, Eavesdropping, Washington Post, Sept. 3, 1980, at B9, col. 5-6 ("Jerzy Kosinski,
the author of Being There and a close observer of the Washington scene, eavesdrops regularly for
material for his novels. He says he has purchased a 'Big Ear' listening device that he found in a
children's toy catalogue, listed as a parabolic microphone. It picks up and amplifies sound from 200
feet away. He says he's attached it to his New York balcony.").
144. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 48 (1967); McFadden, The Mafia of the 1980's: Divided
and UnderSeige, N.Y. Times, March 11, 1987, at B2, col. 3 (parabolic microphones used to listen in
on the Mafia); Bumiller, Eavesdropping, Washington Post., Sept. 3, 1980, at B9, col. 5-6 (parabolic
microphone picks up and amplifies sound from 200 feet away); Graham, Loose Lips Sink Blue Chips,
Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1978, at G3, col. 3 (parabolic microphones can pick up a conversation in
ordinary tones 100 yards away).
145. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
146. Island in Alien Seas, N.Y. Times, April 13, 1987, § A, at 18, col. 1 (Russian laser beams
probe the windows of the U.S. embassy in Moscow for "echoes of conversations"); These Walls Have
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hardware and efficient portable lasers, this equipment could become af-
fordable to the public in the near future.147 A public availability technol-
ogy test would ultimately allow the unfettered use of these devices by law
enforcement officials, particularly when one considers that the cost of
protection against them might be significantly cheaper than the expensive
aerial protections required by Ciraolo and Dow.'48 Thus, a public availa-
bility test would emasculate the fourth amendment privacy guarantees.
The Ciraolo/Dow standards are incomprehensible for a second reason.
Every type of surveillance, regardless of the manner and whether per-
formed from a legally occupied position or not, requires a "physical in-
trusion." In cases where the government officer's body does not
physically enter the suspect's property (the cases this Note considers),
there are two broad classes of surveillance which have both passed fourth
amendment muster in some form. The first class uses strictly receptive
devices (e.g., a camera, eyeball, detectaphone) to analyze information
available to anyone in the public domain. Whether the information trav-
els as a sound wave, or an electromagnetic wave (light), however, the
information always originates from a physical object and propagates
through a physical medium within the suspect's property en route to the
receptor in the public domain. Therefore, whether in plain view or be-
hind an opened door, whether a detectaphone or a spike mike on a heat-
ing duct, this type of "receptor only" surveillance always requires the use
Ears, THE ECONOMIST, April 11, 1987, at 49 ("Lasers provide a new means of eavesdropping. Di-
rected at windows, they can monitor the vibrations created by people talking inside."); Church, The
Art of High-Tech Snooping, TIME, April 20, 1987, at 22 & 23 ("The most exotic technique of all is to
play laser beams against a window or any surface that vibrates slightly with sound waves. The laser
beam senses the minute reverberations and transmits them to a computer that converts them back
into sound"); Spector, Eavesdropping Becomes Undetectable, Washington Post, April 11, 1987, at
A9, col. 2 ("Lasers... are harder to detect. A laser can bounce a light beam against a window,
picking up the slightest vibrations on the glass of a room where people are talking. The beam,
packed with sound, then heads back to a computer which can analyze the contents and recompose
what was said.").
147. This laser equipment has already become portable on trucks. Morganthau, The Battle of
the Bugs, NEWSWEEK, April 20, 1987, at 18 & 19 ("Laser beams may be aimed from trucks at the
embassy windows to detect conversation in the room.").
148. Unlike the expensive dome or orchard of trees required to protect against aerial surveil-
lance, fairly effective protection may be economically achieved against lasersnoopers. Begley, High-
Tech Conversation Stoppers, NEWSWEEK, April 20, 1987, at 20 & 21 (the White House uses heavy
drapes and noisemakers on windows for protection); These Walls Have Ears, THE ECONOMIST,
April 11, 1987, at 49 (recommends mirror windows for protection); Church, The Art of High-Tech
Snooping, TIME, April 20, 1987, at 22 & 23 (some have tried placing "white noise" sound generators
in rooms for protection).
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of elements internal to the subject's property.1 49
The second class of surveillance cases requires the use of a wave gener-
ator (e.g., a flashlight or lasersnooper) and a receptor (e.g., eyeball, laser
monitor), often located external to the suspect's property. After bounc-
ing the wave off a desired target, the officer discovers the content of the
target on the defendant's property by interpreting or recording the reflec-
tion of the wave. Again, as in the first class of surveillance techniques,
there is no way for this technique to work without using the objects and
medium which exist within the suspect's property. Thus, these types of
surveillance all require some physical intrusion.
In determining which types of surveillance fall within the fourth
amendment, therefore, the court should abandon the indeterminate
guidelines of the public availability of the device used and the manner of
surveillance. The court should return to the basic policy in Katz of pro-
tecting reasonable expectations of privacy. There should be a presump-
tion that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy unless the
evidence clearly shows otherwise. This will not unduly burden law en-
forcement officers, who will still be able to conduct searches under a
court authorized warrant.1 50
Accordingly, future courts should limit the Ciraolo and Dow decisions
to the facts of those cases: courts should restrict Ciraolo to overflights
above 1000 feet and restrict Dow to administrative aerial photography of
commercial premises.1 5 Indeed, courts interpreting the cases seem to
have developed the rule that the fourth amendment allows aerial surveil-
lance without a warrant only if it occurs in non-restricted airspace.' 52
VI. CONCLUSION
High technology research continues to produce very useful devices for
law enforcement. Katz v. U.S. and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Con-
149. The daylight observation of a defendant in his backyard (commonly found within the plain
view rule) is a simple case for this first class. The sunlight reflects light off of the defendant and onto
the officer's eyeball (receptor) in the public domain.
150. Giving a subject the presumption of a reasonable expectation of privacy will simply mean
that law enforcement officials will have to conduct more searches under a court authorized warrant.
If probable cause truly exists, this presumption will not prevent any investigation but it will ensure
that everyone enjoys the full fourth amendment guarantees. See supra notes 6 & 9 (warrant
requirements).
151. The dissents suggested this reading. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 216 (1986); Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 240 (1986).
152. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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trol and Safe Streets Act responded to threatened abuses in the applica-
tion of this technology on unwitting individuals.153 Broadly read,
however, the Ciraolo and Dow decisions condone surveillance techniques
of which Katz and Title III disapproved.154 Therefore, fourth amend-
ment analysis may return to the outdated inquiry concerning physical
intrusions coupled with a new examination of public knowledge of the
surveillance tools.' 55 Such analysis would eviscerate the amendment's
protection against unreasonable search and seizure.
The narrow reading of Ciraolo and Dow which this Note proposes
refocuses fourth amendment analysis on the individual's reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy. This narrow reading maintains the traditional Katz
test and enables fourth amendment protection to grow with the develop-
ment of new technology.
Robert M. Evans, Jr.
153. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
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